Summer 2019 POL 241- Chap 8- Stephen Haggard, “The Politics of the Asian Financial Crisis”
Elayne
Guzman
Chap
8- Stephen Haggard, “The Politics of the Asian Financial Crisis”
Quote:
“When countries exhibit
signs of financial vulnerability, the reaction of markets is based in part on
expectations of how governments will respond. When crises actually break, an
even wider array of actors sit in direct judgment on a country’s adjustment
efforts, including international financial institutions, ratings agencies,
financial analysts, banks and institutions. Their assessments also are influence
by political expectations.”
Meaning/Chosen:
The moral hazard problem
in Asia magnified the financial vulnerability of the region during the process
of financial markets centralization in the 1990’s, exposing its fragility via
the macro economic and financial shocks that occurred in the period 1995-1997.
Investments rates and capital inflows in Asia remained high eve after the
negative signals sent by the indications of profitability. In part this
occurred because the interest rates fall in industrial countries (especially in
Japan) lowered the cost of capital for firms and motivated large financial flows
into the Asian countries. However, the crucial factor underlying the sustained investments
rates was the financial side of the moral hazard problem in Asia, leading
national banks to borrow excessively from abroad and lend excessively at home.
The core implications
of moral hazard are that an adverse shock to profitability does not induce
financial intermediaries to be more cautious in lending and to follow financial
strategies reducing overall riskiness of their portfolios.
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